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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appeal is from an Order Construing Will and 
Determining Heirs, a final order of the Fifth District Court for 
Washington County. This appeal was taken to the Supreme Court 
ostensibly under the authority of Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (j) 
and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. Had the 
appeal been taken by a proper party, the Court would have 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. However, the only appeal filed 
in this matter is by Richard L. Hunt as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of the decedent, in his representative capacity; 
no one has filed an appeal in an individual capacity. The 
personal representative is not a party aggrieved by the order 
entered by the District Court; the Appellant therefore lacks 
standing to appeal, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed 
because there is no justiciable controversy. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Does Richard L. Hunt as Personal Representative have 
standing to make this appeal? Specific issues include the 
following: 
1. Since the Order does not affect the estate or 
the personal representative in his representative capacity, 
is the personal representative aggrieved by the Order? 
2. Can an appeal properly be taken by a person not 
aggrieved by an order? 
3. Where an appeal is taken by a person in the 
capacity of a personal representative and the appellant 
subsequently resigns as personal representative, can the 
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appellant thereafter prosecute the appeal in an individual 
capacity? 
4. Is this Court without jurisdiction when there is 
no justiciable controversy? 
[Standard of review does not apply to the above issues] 
B. If the Court addresses the merits of this case, the 
following issue will be presented: Did the District Court 
correctly determine that the entire estate passes to the 
decedent's heirs at law, the Appellees? Specific issues include 
the following: 
1. Do the actual words used in the Will dispose of 
any assets of the estate to anyone? 
2. Is any gift by implication required under the 
terms of the Will? 
3. Does the entire estate pass to decedent's heirs 
at law by intestate succession, notwithstanding the 
disinheritance clause contained in the Will? 
4. Are the decedent's nephew and two nieces his 
heirs? 
[The Standard of Review for these issues is discussed below.] 
C. Should sanctions be imposed on Hunt for taking a 
frivolous appeal? [Standard of review does not apply] 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Hunt contends that the District Court abused its discretion 
(Brief of Appellant, pp. 5, 9). The Heirs are content to have 
this case reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" standard 
adopted by Hunt. The test for abuse of discretion is whether 
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the trial court acted arbitrarily, without employment of 
conscientious judgment, or exceeded the bounds of reason, 
resulting in substantial injustice. See Goodman v. Goodman, 723 
P.2d 219, 222 Mont. 446 (1986); Gakiya v. Hallmark Properties, 
Inc., 722 P.2d 460, 68 Haw. 550 (1986). Judicial discretion is 
abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or 
unreasonable., i.e., only where no reasonable person would take 
the view adopted by the trial court. Ruebke v. Globe Comm. 
Corp., 241 Kan. 595, 738 P.2d 1246 (1987). That clearly is not 
the case here. Appellant cannot establish that the District 
Court abused its discretion. 
However, under Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it 
appears that the standard of review should be "clear error" 
rather than "abuse of discretion." Rule 52(a) states in part 
that "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. . . 
." The "clearly erroneous" standard is well established and 
oft-repeated. Under that standard, the trial court's finding of 
fact will be reversed "only if, after marshalling all relevant 
evidence from the record, the appellant demonstrates that the 
finding was clearly erroneous." Fife v. Fife, 111 P.2d 512, 513 
(Utah App. 1989), citing Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919, 
922 (Utah 1988). Even where the evidence is entirely in written 
form, the standard of review is whether the findings of fact are 
"clearly erroneous." Rule 52(a) specifically refers to findings 
based on documentary evidence as being subject to this standard. 
See also Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 
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688 P.2d 1191 (Idaho App. 1984); Treasure Valley Plumbing and 
Heating, Inc. v. Earth Resources Company, Inc., 7 66 P. 2d 1254 
(Idaho App. 1988). It is appropriate to give deference to the 
trial court's analysis of the documentary evidence considered in 
light of arguments presented to that court. 
However, the Heirs also recognize that in some instances 
where the evidence consists entirely of documentary evidence 
that is also before the appellate court, and where the demeanor 
of witnesses or conflicting testimony is not involved, the 
appellate court may substitute its own judgment for that of the 
trial court. See Lake v. Hermes Associates, 552 P.2d 126, 128 
(Utah 1976); Matter of Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 
916, 918 (Utah App. 1988). Even if that standard applies, the 
Heirs submit that an independent evaluation by this Court will 
reach the same findings and conclusions as were found by the 
District Court. 
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness without any 
special deference. Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 
1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). Therefore, 
the conclusions of law are reviewed under a "correction of 
error" standard. Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah App. 1989). 
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988). 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
The texts of the following statutes and rules are set forth 
in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(3) 
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Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(17) 
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(21) 
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(28) 
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-101 
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-103(1)(c) 
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-603 
Utah Code Annotated §75-3-101 
Rule 33, Utah R. App. P. 
Rule 33(a), R. Utah S. Ct. 
Rule 40, R. Utah S. Ct. 
Rule 52 (a), R. C. P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and 
Disposition Below 
This appeal is from an Order Construing Will and 
Determining Heirs, a final order of the Fifth District Court for 
Washington County. This case involves the interpretation of a 
decedent's Will in a probate proceeding. The personal 
representative and the heirs at law of the decedent filed 
separate petitions for interpretation or construction of the 
decedent's Will in order to determine the beneficiaries entitled 
to inherit the decedent!s estate [Record, pp. 15-17, 31-35]. 
After a hearing and the filing of memoranda of points and 
authorities, the District Court issued an Order Construing Will 
and Determining Heirs [Record, pp. 69-72]. The Order determined 
that the decedent's Will failed to dispose of any assets, that 
the entire estate therefore passed by intestacy to the 
Page 5 
decedent's heirs at law, and that the heirs at law are the 
nieces and nephew of the decedent. The personal representative 
filed this appeal from that Order [Record, pp. 73-74]. 
Statement of Facts 
Reed Dwane Hunt died on December 3, 1988, a resident of 
Washington County, Utah [Record, p. 1] . The decedent had no 
children, was unmarried at the time of his death, and his 
parents predeceased him [Findings of Fact, 5 B,(Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law contained in the Order--see copy of the 
Order in Addendum]. Decedent had four stepchildren, Richard L. 
Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and Denice Marie 
Hunt [Findings of Fact, 1 E] . The stepchildren were never 
adopted by decedent [Findings of Fact, 1 E] . The decedent's 
nearest relatives and heirs at law are his nephew and two nieces 
(children of his only sibling, a deceased sister with whom he 
had resided prior to her death) [Findings of Fact, 1 C-D; 
Conclusions of Law, 5 F] . These nieces and nephew are the 
Appellees. 
The day before decedent died, he signed a pre-printed form 
Will with typewritten entries [see copy of the Will in 
Addendum]. The Will has no disposition clause. The first 
paragraph identifies the decedent and revokes all prior Wills. 
The second paragraph declares that the decedent is a single man, 
that he has four stepchildren, names the stepchildren, and 
states that if any person establishes that he is a child of the 
decedent, the child will receive five dollars and no more. The 
third paragraph is a disinheritance clause giving one dollar to 
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any person determined to be an heir. The final paragraph names 
Richard L. Hunt (one of the stepchildren) as Personal 
Representative, waives bond, and grants a power of sale [see 
copy of the Will in Addendum]. 
Richard L. Hunt filed an Application for Informal Probate 
of Will and Informal Appointment of Personal Representative, on 
January 10, 1989 [Record, pp. 1-3]. Paragraph 4 of the 
Application incorrectly declares under oath that the heirs and 
devisees of the decedent are the stepchildren; no mention of the 
true heirs at law if given in the Application [Record, pp. 1-2]. 
Richard L. Hunt was appointed Personal Representative on 
February 6, 1989 [Record, pp. 11-12]. On April 8, 1989, Richard 
L. Hunt filed a Petition for Interpretation of Last Will and 
Testament, by which he requested the Court to enter an order 
declaring that the entire estate pass to the stepchildren 
[Record, pp. 15-17]. Paragraph 3 of the Petition incorrectly 
states under oath that the heirs of the decedent under the 
intestate succession laws "would be surviving uncles and aunts." 
[Record, p. 15]. At the hearing, the hearing on the Petition 
was continued without date (the minute entry incorrectly states 
that three of the heirs were present; those present were three 
of the stepchildren, not heirs) [Record, p. 23]. Notice of 
neither the Application for Probate nor the Petition for 
Interpretation of Last Will and Testament were given to any of 
the decedent's heirs [Record, pp. 5, 19]. On May 15, a 
Withdrawal of Attorney was filed by Phillip L. Foremaster, 
counsel for the personal representative [Record, p. 29], The 
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withdrawing attorney stated "I have been unable to get the 
personal representative to cooperate with me in preparing and 
filing an inventory and appraisement nor have I been able to get 
him to agree with me on a course of action in the probate to 
properly settle the estate. As a result I feel I have no 
recourse except to file my withdrawal of attorney." [Record, p. 
30] . 
On June 13, 1989, one of the nieces filed a "Petition for 
Construction of Will; Adjudication of Intestacy for Disposition 
of Estate; Determination of Heirs; and Removal of Personal 
Representative and Formal Appointment of Special Administrator 
or Successor Personal Representative, or in the alternative, for 
Bond and Supervised Administration" [Record, pp. 31-35] At a 
hearing held July 11, 1989, the court ordered that the personal 
representative be restrained from disposing of any assets of the 
estate, and counsel for the personal representative stated that 
an inventory and appraisement would be filed [Record, p. 49]. 
Following the hearing and the subsequent submission of 
supplemental and responsive memoranda of points and authorities, 
the District Court on September 6, 1989, entered an Order 
Construing Will and Determining Heirs, which includes Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. [Record, pp. 69-72; see copy of 
the Order in Addendum] . By the Order, the stepchildren take 
nothing and the entire estate passes by intestacy to the nieces 
and nephew (the Appellees) as decedent's heirs [Conclusions of 
Law, 1 A-G; Order, 1 1-2]. 
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A Notice of Appeal was filed by "Richard L. Hunt, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Reed Dwane Hunt" on October 6, 
1989 [Record, pp. 73-74; see copy of the Notice of Appeal in 
Addendum]. No appeal has been taken by any of the stepchildren 
in their individual capacities or by any other person. 
At the hearing of the Petition for Removal of Richard L. 
Hunt as Personal Representative held November 9, 1989, Richard 
L. Hunt resigned as personal representative [Record, pp. 83-84]. 
The personal representative was ordered to submit an Inventory 
and Appraisement for the estate and a first and final accounting 
for his tenure as personal representative, no later than 
December 8, 1989 [Record, pp. 83, 86]. As of May 7, 1990, 
Richard L. Hunt has still failed to comply with the court order 
to file an Inventory and Appraisement and a first and final 
accounting. 
In this Brief, the Appellant (Richard L. Hunt, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Reed Dwane Hunt) is sometimes 
referred to as "Hunt." Appellees are sometimes referred to as 
"the Heirs." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Only a person aggrieved by a district court's order may 
appeal the order. A personal representative is not aggrieved by 
an order determining heirs or interpreting a Will, since such an 
order affects only the beneficiaries or claimants between 
themselves; the estate and the fiduciary's capacity are not 
affected. Hunt improperly appealed in the capacity of personal 
representative. No one appealed in an individual capacity. 
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Hunt subsequently resigned as personal representative, but has 
continued to prosecute this appeal. His resignation bars his 
right to prosecute the appeal, even if the appeal had been 
properly taken. Hunt lacks standing to appeal. Therefore, the 
lack of a justiciable controversy divests the court of 
jurisdiction and requires summary affirmance. (POINT I) 
The decedent's Will fails to dispose of any assets. It has 
no dispositive clause. It states no intent to make a gift, 
mentions no property to be given, and names no intended 
beneficiary of any gift. A decedent's intent can be determined 
only by the actual words of the Will. A reading of this Will 
compels but one reasonable conclusion: the words of this Will 
express no intent to devise assets to anyone. The Will also 
fails the rigorous test for gifts by implication. (POINT II) 
Since the Will disposes of no assets, the entire estate 
passes to decedent's heirs at law by intestate succession. The 
disinheritance clauses in the Will do not supersede the 
statutory rules of intestate succession; heirs can be 
disinherited only by a valid testamentary disposition of the 
estate. (POINT III) 
Decedent's heirs are his nieces and nephew, the Appellees. 
(POINT IV) 
Hunt's appeal is frivolous and interposed for delay. Hunt 
as personal representative is not a proper party to appeal. 
Hunt has no reasonable factual or legal basis for this appeal. 
Hunt's actions demonstrate his intent to use his position for 
personal advantage, without notice to and in disregard of the 
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rights of decedent's heirs. This appeal has forced Respondents 
to incur substantial expense and delay for no valid reason. 
This is an appropriate case for the imposition of sanctions on 
Hunt under Rule 33, Utah R. App. P. (POINT V) 
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ARGUMENT 
I THE APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE LACKS STANDING TO APPEAL AND NO ONE 
ELSE APPEALED 
A personal representative acting in his representative 
capacity is an impartial stakeholder as between the conflicting 
claims of heirs or devisees. The personal representative is a 
fiduciary whose duty is to deal impartially with all 
beneficiaries. He cannot participate in the adjudication of 
conflicting claims of would-be beneficiaries or heirs. After 
the court construes a Will, determines heirs, or authorizes 
distribution of assets, the role of the personal representative 
is to carry out the order of the court. Each beneficiary or 
claimant must protect his or her own rights if affected by such 
a court order. The right to appeal belongs to the persons 
aggrieved by such an order, such as the heirs or devisees. A 
personal representative is not entitled to appeal from an order 
construing a Will since neither the estate nor the personal 
representative can be aggrieved by the order. 
A. A Person Must Be Aggrieved by an Order to 
Appeal 
To be a proper party to an appeal, "an appellant 
generally must show both that he or she was a party or privy to 
the action below and that he or she is aggrieved by that court's 
judgment." Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P. 2d 
1166 (Utah 1987) . In In re Deseret Mortuary Company, 78 Utah 
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393, 400-01, 3 P.2d 267 (1931), the Court ruled an appellant 
must have a direct, pecuniary interest: 
Not only must a party desiring to appeal have an 
interest in the particular question litigated, but his 
interest must be immediate and pecuniary . . . . 
The damage or grievance . . . must be a direct 
and positive one, effected by the judgment concluding 
and acting upon his rights; and such damage must be by 
the record, and not in consequence of it. Persons 
aggrieved in this sense, are not those who may happen 
to entertain desires on the subject, but only those 
who have rights which may be enforced at law, and 
whose pecuniary interests might be established in 
whole or in part by the decree. 
This rule is a long-standing principle adopted by 
statute in many states and applied as common law in others. For 
example, in Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow, 81 N.M. 379, 467 P.2d 
395, 397 (1970), the Supreme Court of New Mexico stated that 
only an aggrieved party may appeal: 
The right to appellate review of a judgment or order 
exists only in one who is aggrieved or prejudiced 
thereby. . . . 
An aggrieved party . . . is one having an 
interest recognized by law in the subject matter which 
is injuriously affected by the judgment, or one whose 
property rights or personal interests are directly 
affected by the operation of the judgment. . . . 
Parties may appeal only if they have a real and 
substantial interest in the subject matter before the 
court, and are aggrieved or prejudiced by the 
decision. To be aggrieved, a party must have a 
personal or pecuniary interest or property right 
adversely affected by the judgment. 
See also In re Estate of Griswold 13 Ariz. App. 218, 475 P. 2d 
508, 511 (1970) . 
B. An Order Not A f f e c t i n g the P e r s o n a l 
Representative in His Representative Capacity 
Cannot be Appealed by Him 
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"The great weight of authority is to the effect that 
an executor or an administrator as such is not aggrieved or 
prejudiced by a decree determining the rights of the 
beneficiaries, and hence may not appeal." Re Estate of Fusz, 
397 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1966) (emphasis added). This is a long-
standing rule of wide application: 
"The majority rule in the United States is that one in 
a representative capacity cannot appeal from an order 
or judgment in an action, in which he, in his 
representative capacity, is a party, unless that order 
or judgment adversely affects or prejudices the estate 
which he is administering." In re Trustees Under Will 
of Yost, 141 N.E.2d 176, 179 (Ohio 1956). 
"An executor or administrator as such is not an 
aggrieved party where the judgment affects only the 
rights of beneficiaries among themselves. . . . The 
correctness of a determination that a certain person 
is the decedent's sole heir is not a matter on which 
the administrator can appeal." 4 Am. Jur. 2d, "Appeal 
and Error," § 215, at 719-20. 
In this case, the District Court entered an order 
interpreting the Will of the decedent and determining the heirs 
who inherit by intestate succession since no assets are devised 
by the Will. It is proper for a personal representative to seek 
interpretation of a Will by the court; however, once the court 
makes its decision, the only responsibility of the personal 
representative was to carry out the order of the court. A 
personal representative is not affected in his administration of 
the estate by the court's decision on which persons are entitled 
to receive distribution of estate assets. In our case the 
estate was neither endangered nor diminished by the Order. See 
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In re Trustees Under Will of Yost, 141 N.E .2d 176, 178-179 (Ohio 
1956) . 
Appellate courts routinely dismiss appeals by a 
personal representative in this situation: 
In order for an executor, administrator, or guardian 
to appeal in their fiduciary capacity . . . the 
judgment . . . appealed from must affect them in their 
fiduciary character. . . . Executors and 
administrators may not appeal where the judgment 
appealed from affects only the rights of the 
beneficiaries among themselves. . . . 
The decree appealed from adjudicated the rights 
of the litigants among themselves and was not against 
the appellant in her representative capacity; 
therefore, appellant was not entitled to appeal. 
House v. Roberts, 254 So.2d 904, 906, (Miss. 1971). 
In In re Lee's Estate, 243 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Okla. 
1952), the court dismissed a similar appeal by the personal 
representative: 
Since an administrator in his representative capacity 
can never be a "party aggrieved" or "party interested" 
in a decree which merely determines the heirs at law 
of the estate for which he is administrator, he cannot 
maintain in his representative capacity an appeal from 
such decree. . . . When the court, after a proper 
hearing, has determined the matter and designated the 
persons who are entitled to receive the estate, as to 
that phase of the proceeding the interest of the 
administrator ceases. 
In Shocket v. Silberman, 209 Va. 490, 165 S.E.2d 414 
(1969), the court likewise dismissed the appeal of the personal 
representative: 
The executor is not aggrieved by the decree by which 
he seeks an appeal. In his bill he merely asked for 
the aid and guidance of the lower court in the 
interpretation of the will and the decree complained 
of gave him this relief. The interpretation in no way 
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adversely affected the estate represented by the 
executor. 
In In re Ray's Estate, 233 P.2d 393, 396 (Nev. 1951), 
the court dismissed the personal representative's appeal of a 
decree of distribution, noting that "the general rule is that an 
administrator, as such, cannot appeal from a decree of 
distribution determining the persons who should receive an 
estate, either as heirs at law of the decedent or as 
distributees under a Will" (quoting In re Maher's Estate, 195 
Wash. 126, 79 P.2d 984). In Desmond v. Persina, 381 A.2d 633, 
637-38 (Me. 1978), the appellate court also agreed the order did 
not infringe upon the representative's pecuniary or proprietary 
interests, and since the representative must adopt a neutral 
position respecting the conflicting claims of beneficiaries, the 
representative must refrain from asserting appellate rights of 
one claimant against another. The beneficiaries or claimants 
must protect their own rights by appealing if they so desire. 
In Estate of Evans, 704 P.2d 35 (Mont. 1985), the Court 
held that a co-personal representative was not a party aggrieved 
for purposes of appealing an order interpreting a Will: "While 
a personal representative may request the District Court to 
interpret the will . . . [she] has no standing to appeal the 
resulting court order. Because she is not a residuary devisee, 
she has no interest adversely affected by the order." Id. at 
40. 
Even where the personal representative is one of the 
heirs or devisees, any appeal by the personal representative in 
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a representative capacity will be dismissed. A personal 
representative breaches fiduciary duties when he or she attempts 
to maintain or prosecute a contested personal claim as heir or 
devisee at the expense of the estate. An appeal may properly be 
taken only by the interested person in his or her individual 
capacity. In Dockray v. O'Leary, 286 Mass. 589, 190 N.E. 798 
(1934), the court determined that the executor had no further 
interest in the outcome of the action except to abide by and 
carry out the instruction of the court in distribution of the 
estate; where he did not assert his personal interest by 
appealing in his individual capacity, he had no interest as 
executor that would make him in his official capacity a person 
aggrieved. See House v. Roberts, 254 So.2d 904 (Miss. 1977); 
Estate of Ristman, 300 P.2d 409 (Or. 1956); Estate of McCabe, 
11 Ariz. App. 555, 466 P.2d 774 (1970); Re Murphey's Estate, 7 
Cal. 2d 712, 62 P.2d 374 (1936); Re Babb Estate's, 200 Cal. 
252, 252 P. 1039 (1927); In re Estate of Marrey, 65 Cal. 287, 3 
P. 896 (1884). 
C. Hunt's Subsequent Resignation as Personal 
Representative Bars His Prosecution of the 
Appeal 
The Notice of Appeal denominates Appellant as "Richard 
L. Hunt, Personal Representative of the Estate of Reed Dwane 
Hunt." It has already been demonstrated that a personal 
representative cannot properly appeal in this situation. In 
addition, Hunt resigned as personal representative on November 
9, 1989, and is no longer functioning in that capacity. Since 
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he is no longer the personal representative, he has no right to 
perpetuate this appeal in that capacity. For this appeal to be 
prosecuted, it would be necessary for the successor personal 
representative to be substituted as the appellant. This has not 
been done. Richard L. Hunt as an individual is a separate 
entity from Richard L. Hunt as personal representative. Richard 
L. Hunt as an individual filed no notice of appeal. 
Further, the Docketing Statement and the Brief of Appellant 
were filed by Hunt as personal representative after his 
resignation as personal representative, and therefore after his 
authority to do so had expired. Respondents request that the 
Docketing Statement and Brief of Appellant be stricken. Since 
Hunt is no longer personal representative and cannot prosecute 
the appeal in the capacity of personal representative, summary 
affirmance should be ordered. Richard L. Hunt as an individual 
did not file a notice of appeal and is not a party to this 
appeal, yet he is attempting to prosecute the appeal. The 
party to an appeal cannot be allowed to change without making 
application to the court or without leave of court, yet that is 
what Richard L. Hunt is attempting to do in this situation in 
order to circumvent his error in failing to file a notice of 
appeal as an individual. This is impermissible. 
D. Since Richard L. Hunt as Personal 
Representative Has No Standing to Appeal, the 
Lack of a Justiciable Controversy Divests the 
Court of Jurisdiction 
"The right to appeal and whether an appellant is a 
party aggrieved . . . are jurisdictional questions which may be 
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raised at any time and by the court itself, Love v. White, 348 
Mo. 640, 154 S.W.2d 759, 760." Re Estate of Fusz, 397 S.W.2d 
595 (Mo. 1966). Lack of jurisdiction at any stage of a 
proceeding is always subject to scrutiny by the courts. Desmond 
v. Persina, 381 A.2d 633, 638 (Me. 1978). "The appellant must 
demonstrate the existence of a justiciable controversy . 
which we have defined as 'a claim of right buttressed by a 
sufficiently substantial interest to warrant judicial 
protection.In Id. 
Even though the personal representative participated 
in the hearing at the District Court level and was entitled to 
seek instructions of the Court regarding interpretation of the 
Will, the personal representative did not thereby acquire a 
right to appeal in the absence of a showing that he was 
aggrieved by the Order. See In re Lee's Estate, 243 P.2d 1013, 
1015 (Okla. 1952); In re Trustee under Yost's Will, 141 N.E.2d 
176, 178-79 (Ohio 1956). Here, Hunt lacks standing to appeal; 
therefore, there is no justiciable controversy, and this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to proceed. Hunt admits (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 4) that the decedent's stepchildren are the real parties 
aggrieved by the Order. However, the stepchildren are not and 
cannot be represented on this appeal by Hunt; none of the 
stepchildren has filed a notice of appeal or taken any other 
step to perfect the appeal. The filing by Hunt was 
unequivocally done in his capacity as personal representative, 
not in an individual capacity. 
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This Court must dismiss the appeal or grant summary 
affirmance. 
II. THE DECEDENT'S WILL FAILS TO DISPOSE OF ANY ASSETS 
The District Court found that Decedent's Will makes no 
disposition of assets. This finding is critical to the 
conclusion that the estate passes by the law of intestate 
succession. The testator is presumed to intend the effect of 
the terms of his Will. Therefore the decedent intended the 
distribution of his estate according to the rules of intestate 
succession, because he made no attempt whatsoever to dispose of 
any assets. No individual is identified as a beneficiary, and 
no property is identified as an asset to be disposed of under 
the Will. 
A. The Testator's Intent is to be Determined by 
the Meaning of the Words Actually Used in the 
Will 
Hunt inaccurately claims support from U.C.A. § 75-2-
603, which states that "the intention of a testator as expressed 
in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions." 
This principle does not mean the Court may add language to the 
Will under the guise of construction. The Court is limited to 
the language in the Will. A court determines the intention of 
the testator by interpreting a Will from the language actually 
used in the Will: 
The testator's intention regarding the beneficiary of 
the residue, is to be ascertained from the words of 
the will . . . . The purpose of construction as 
applied to wills is unquestionably to arrive, if 
possible, at the intention of the testator; but the 
intention to be sought for is not that which existed 
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in the mind of the testator, but that which is 
expressed in the language of the will. It is not the 
business of the court to say, in examining the terms 
of the will, what the testator intended, but what is 
the meaning to be given to the language which he used. 
Estate of DeMoulin, 225 P.2d 303, 306 (Cal. 1951) 
(emphasis added). 
In Estate of Deacon, 342 P. 2d 261 (1959), the 
decedent's Will contained no residuary clause. The court noted 
that the testatrix's intention is derived from the words used: 
This court cannot write words into a will that 
are not fairly and reasonably contained therein. 
It may well be that the testatrix had some 
intention other than that set forth in the will. 
It is reasonable to believe that she had in mind 
putting in a general residuary clause but, if 
so, she did not disclose that intention to us. . 
. . Courts are not to look for 'some undeclared 
purpose which m^y be imagined to fre in 'his miftdr 
but the intention disclosed by the words he has 
US£d.' Xd. at 264 (emphasis added). 
As a result, the residue passed by intestacy. The same result 
was reached in Estate of Corwin, 383 P. 2d 339, 342 (Ida. 1963) 
where the court distinguished between construction of terms and 
supplying terms: 






of the testator, what he 
he intended to 




intended to do. 
declare in his Will, 
determine 
but 
what was meant 
did declare in her 







e r e i n • 
[citations]. Presumptions and auxiliary rules 
applicable to probate matters are all 
subordinate to the cardinal rule just 
enunciated. [citations] (emphasis added). 
In our case, the District Court's decision to refrain from 
supplying terms must be affirmed. 
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B . A Will Is Never Open to Construction Merely to 
Avoid Intestacy or Because the Will Fails to 
Dispose of the Entire Estate 
Courts favor testacy rather than intestacy. A Will 
evidencing an intention to dispose of the entire estate should 
be interpreted, if possible, in such a manner as to prevent 
intestacy. Hunt relies on these maxims, but that reliance is 
misplaced. These rules apply only when the actual language used 
in the Will is ambiguous and it is necessary to construe that 
language. In our case, the Will is somewhat unusual in that it 
makes no disposition of assets, but the actual language of the 
Will is unambiguous. There is no ambiguity in the actual 
language of the Will which requires resort to rules of 
construction. In addition, Utah statutes specifically recognize 
that a Will may not dispose of the assets of the estate, and 
these statutes therefore provide for the estate not disposed of 
by the Will to vest in and pass to the heirs. See U.C.A. §§75-
2-101 and 75-3-101. 
Extrinsic evidence may be used if there is an imperfect 
description of the subject matter of the gift or an ambiguity as 
to the identity of a beneficiary, such as where a brother and a 
nephew have the same name, and only the name is given in the 
Will. But neither extrinsic evidence nor construction can be 
used to supply missing dispositive language in a Will. For 
example, in the Will in Estate of DeMoulin, 225 P. 2d 303, 306 
(Cal. 1951), there was "a total failure to name or describe a 
beneficiary of the residue." The court therefore allowed the 
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residue to pass by intestacy. The same is true in our case: no 
one is designated as a beneficiary, and no gift of property is 
made. 
Matter of Estate of Lewis, 738 P.2d 617 (Utah 1987), a 
unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice Hall, disposes of 
this issue. In that case, the testator's holographic Will named 
his wife, Rhoda, and directed the personal representative to 
"insure for her comfort, security and her fair portion." Id. at 
618. The district court found that the Will failed to dispose 
of the testator's assets and ordered distribution of the estate 
to the testator's heirs. As in our case, the appellant 
(decedent's wife) in Lewis argued for an interpretation of the 
Will that would prevent intestacy. The wife made a number of 
arguments on appeal, claiming that she was entitled to the 
entire estate, a power of appointment, a share equal to the 
widow's intestate share, or the "bulk" of the estate. This 
Court concluded that the language of the Will was merely 
precatory in nature, stating: 
This conclusion is not in conflict with the probate 
code. The presumption against intestacy used when 
construing testamentary instruments is based upon the 
assumption that by executing a will, the testator 
intended for his property to pass testate. To this 
end, a will first and foremost must be construed 
according to the intent of the testator as expressed 
from the words of the will and circumstances under 
which it was executed. In this case, testator's will 
merely expressed his intent that his wife be properly 
cared for, but did not dispose of any property or 
create any power of appointment. Id. at 620 (emphasis 
added). 
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In Lewis, this Court agreed with the fundamental principle that 
the intent of the testator is controlling, but determined that 
the testator's intention could in no way be determined from the 
face of the Will; the Court therefore refused to speculate as 
to the testator's intention. Id. at 621. "The dispositive 
portion of the will is too indefinite to be construed as 
leaving any definite portion of the estate to appellant." Id. 
at 622. The estate therefore passed by intestacy. 
The law of other states and common law agree that a Will 
does not require construction because it fails to dispose of the 
decedent's assets: 
To say that because a will does not dispose of all of 
the testator's property it is ambiguous and must be 
construed so as to prevent intestacy, either total or 
partial, is to use a rule of construction as the 
reason for construction. But a will is never open to 
construction merely because it does not dispose of all 
of the testator's property. 'Courts are not permitted 
in order to avoid a conclusion of intestacy to adopt a 
construction based on conjecture as to what the 
testator may have intended, although not expressed.' 
Estate of Beldon, 11 Cal. 2d 108, 112, 77 P.2d 1052, 
1054 (1938); Estate of DeMoulin, 225 P.2d 303, 306 
(Cal. 1950). 
After noting the general rule favoring testacy over intestacy, 
the Supreme Court of Idaho stated: 
However, in order to avoid intestacy, either partial 
or complete, the court is not permitted to put on the 
will any construction not expressed in it, and which 
is based on supposition as to the intention of the 
testator in the disposition of his estate. Estate of 
Corwin, 383 P. 2d 339, 341 (Ida. 1963). 
In Estate of Barnes, 47 Cal. Rptr. 480, 407 P.2d 656, 
659 (Cal. 1965), the court acknowledged the rule that a will 
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should be construed according to the intention of the testator 
and so as to avoid intestacy, but the court nevertheless 
concluded that the property must pass by intestacy since "a, 
court may not write a will which the testator did not write" 
(emphasis added). The court concluded that "any selection by 
the courts now would be to indulge in forbidden conjecture" and 
that the declared intention of the testatrix to dispose of all 
her property "does not authorize the courts under the auise of 
construction to supply dispositive clauses lacking from the 
will. " Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court in Estate of Corwin, 383 P.2d 339, 342 (Ida. 
1963), likewise concluded that "Courts are not permitted in 
order to avoid a conclusion of intestacy to adopt a construction 
based on conjecture as to what the testator may have intended, 
although not expressed, [citations]" 
Finally, the preference for constructions which avoid 
intestacy is no stronger than the rule preferring heirs over 
non-heirs, as the eminent author of a treatise on Wills has 
stated: 
The presumption against intestacy is of no greater 
force than the presumption in favor of the heir. . . 
It is always held by the court where the Will is 
equally susceptible of two constructions, one in favor 
of the heirs and the other in favor of some more 
distant relative, that the one in favor of the heir 
will be preferred. In construing a will, the courts, 
in case of doubt, lean toward a construction which 
conforms as nearly as possible to the statutes of 
descent and distribution. 2 Page, A Treatise on the 
Law of Wills (Third [Lifetime] Edition), p. 855 
(emphasis added). 
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This rule would prefer the Heirs over the stepchildren even if 
construction of the Will were necessary. 
C. The Words Used in Our Decedent's Will Express 
No Intention that Assets Pass to the 
Stepchildren or to Anyone Else 
Courts interpreting a Will search for the reasonable 
meaning of the words which the testator has actually used. 
Here, the words used by the testator do not dispose of his 
estate to anyone. No words in the Will can reasonably be 
construed as a disposition of the estate in any manner. The 
rule of law is fixed: 
In construing a will the court has no power to make a 
will for the testator or to attempt to improve upon 
the will which the testator actually made. The court 
cannot begin by inferring testator's intention and 
then construe the will so as to give effect to this 
intention, however probable it may be; nor can it 
rewrite the will, in whole or in part, to conform to 
such presumed intention." 2 Page, Treatise on the Law 
of Wills (Third [Lifetime] Edition) pp. 812-814. 
The Brief of Appellant is essentially unsupported 
assertions that the Will "clearly" disposes of the estate to the 
stepchildren. Nothing could be further from the truth. In 
fact, a reading of the actual language of the Will reveals in 
brilliant clarity that the Will disposes of no assets. No gift 
is made in the Will. No words of grant are contained in it. 
There is no bequest, no devise, no transfer of any particular 
asset to any beneficiary. There are no gifts of personal 
effects or other specific items. There is no residuary clause. 
There is emphatically no gift whatsoever. 
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To constitute a valid disposition under a Will, the 
testator must (1) intend to make a gift, (2) indicate to whom 
the gift is to be made, and (3) specify the property to be 
given. Even a cursory reading of the Will establishes that 
none of these three necessary elements are present in our case: 
the testator makes no statement of intent to make a gift, no 
designation of any individual as a beneficiary of a gift, and 
no specification of any property that is to be given. Hunt 
fails to meet any of the three elements logically required for 
an effective gift. 
Once again, Matter of Estate of Lewis, 738 P.2d 617 (Utah 
1987) (discussed above) disposes of Hunt's argument in our 
case. The Will in Lewis specifically identified the intended 
beneficiary, testator's wife Rhoda, as the object of his 
bounty. The testator expressly wanted to "insure for her 
comfort, security and her fair portion." Therefore, the 
testator both identified a beneficiary and stated that he 
wanted to make provision for her. Nevertheless, no 
distribution could properly be made under the Will because the 
dispositive provision was too indefinite. The facts in Lewis 
are much stronger for the claimant there than the facts in our 
case. In our case, there is not even an expressed intent that 
a beneficiary be properly cared for, as there was in Lewis. 
The Will does not designate anyone as a beneficiary, and is 
absolutely silent as to a direction to provide any asset or 
benefit to anyone. No intention to make a gift can be drawn 
from the words in the Will, and the Court must refuse to 
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speculate as to the testator's intention, as it refused in 
Lewis. 
Through tortuous reasoning, Hunt attempts to extract from 
the standard disinheritance clause in paragraph Third of the 
Will, some mandate for making a distribution to the 
stepchildren. Hunt's argument has no basis in fact or law. 
Hunt repeats ad nauseam throughout his Brief that the 
disinheritance clause excludes from participation in the estate 
everyone except the stepchildren. This simply is not true, and 
Hunt's frequent repetition does not make it so. The 
disinheritance clause in paragraph Third expressly disinherits 
"any and all of my heirs and next of kin who are not 
specifically mentioned herein" and "any and all persons 
whomsoever claiming to be or who may be lawfully determined to 
be my heirs at law, except as otherwise mentioned in this Will." 
This is standard disinheritance language, found as boilerplate 
in many Wills. It disinherits those who might claim to be the 
heirs at law of the decedent. The reference to those "otherwise 
mentioned in this Will" refers only to heirs who are otherwise 
mentioned. By definition, that cannot refer to the 
stepchildren, since stepchildren are not heirs (see Argument 
Point IV.A. below). The disinheritance clause is standard 
language disinheriting heirs. A testator who uses a legal term 
is presumed to use the word in its legal sense. See In Re 
Ricklefs's Estate, 211 Kan. 713, 508 P.2d 866 (1973); Jackson v. 
Lee, 193 Kan. 40, 392 P.2d 92 (1964); Erickson v. Reinbold, 6 
Wash.App. 407, 493 P.2d 794 (1972). An heir is a person 
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entitled to inherit by intestate succession, and does not 
include stepchildren. Therefore, the disinheritance clause 
makes no reference at all to the stepchildren. Hunt strains out 
a gnat and swallows a camel. There is no justification for the 
construction of the Will proposed by Hunt. Also, Hunt claims 
(Brief of Appellant, pp. 3, 5) that the Will refers to the 
stepchildren as the decedent's heirs and next of kin; Hunt 
misreads the Will, since nowhere does it refer to the 
stepchildren as heirs or next of kin. 
Further, the specific naming of the stepchildren appears to 
be an attempt to disinherit them, not to benefit them. 
Paragraph Second of the Will states as follows: 
Second: I declare that I am a single man, and that I 
have four (4) step-childern [sic] . Richard L Hunt, 
Delbert Douglas Hunt, Denise Marie Buckley, and Dennis 
Ray Hunt. If, at any time, any person shall be 
established by a Court of Law to be a child of mine, 
then I give and bequeath to each such person the sum 
of Five Dollars ($5.00) and no more. 
The specific naming of the stepchildren and then following their 
names with a statement disinheriting any person established by a 
court to be a child of the decedent, appears to be designed to 
pre-empt any attempt by the stepchildren to claim to be actual 
children of the decedent. Apparently fearing that one of the 
stepchildren might, after his death, assert a fraudulent claim 
to be a child, the decedent specifically named them and 
disinherited them should they attempt to do so. 
Hunt asserts that the District Court failed to make any 
findings on the intention of testator (Brief of Appellant, pp. 3-
Page 2 9 
4). Findings of fact must be construed liberally and in favor 
of the judgment. 
As noted above, the "intent" the court looks for is not the 
subjective intent of the testator, but the intent expressed by 
his Will. The result achieved by the Will is included in the 
court's findings, and constitutes the intent of the testator; 
the testator is presumed to intend the consequences of his Will. 
The District Court specifically found that the Will of the 
decedent fails to dispose of any assets. That is the finding of 
the intention of the testator, and it is entitled to any 
inferences (including inferred subordinate findings, if any) in 
order to support it. The finding is sufficient as it is. 
However, even if a separate express finding were necessary, this 
Court has the power to supply the finding since this Court has 
the Will before it. 
D . The Will Does Not Evidence a Gift by 
Implication 
Hunt claims the Will makes a gift by implication. 
Since courts endeavor to ascertain the intention of the testator 
from the Will, on rare occasions property will be disposed of by 
necessary implication when the Will taken cis a whole shows a 
clear intent to make a specific gift to a specific person. 
However, for this to occur, the Will must inescapably reveal a 
dominant dispositive plan for such a gift. Gift by implication 
is not favored: 
The presumption is very strong, however, against [the 
testator] having intended any devise or bequest which 
he has not set forth in his will. There must be a 
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probability arising from the whole will that testator 
intended to make the bequest or devise, which he has 
not set forth expressly, so strong that it cannot be 
supposed that any other intention existed in the mind 
of testator. This intention must appear from the 
language which is used in the will. The fact that 
testator makes no specific provision . . . does not 
justify the court in construing the will so as to make 
a gift by implication. 2 Page, A Treatise on the Law 
of Wills, (Third [Lifetime] Edition) pp.861-862. 
For example, in Brock v. Hall, 206 P.2d 360 (Cal.), the 
decedent's trust divided his estate between his two children, 
providing for disposition of the estate in the event of various 
contingencies relating to the possible marriage, birth of 
offspring, or death of the children. However, the trust failed 
to cover the actual contingency which eventually occurred. 
Nevertheless, because the trust explicitly made gifts to the 
children and provided for a substitutional gift in several 
possible situations, the court concluded that it was the 
decedent's intention for the entire estate to go to one child 
when the other child died without issue or spouse. 
The trust in Brock contained a clear "dominant dispositive 
plan" whereby "the probability that the trustor intended to make 
a gift in this contingency is so strong as to nullify the 
existence of any other possible intent." Id. at 365 (emphasis 
added). That is a very different situation than the Will we are 
now considering, which not only has no "dominant dispositive 
plan"--it has no disposition at all. This Court must ask 
itself, "Does the language of this Will imply a gift to the 
stepchildren so strongly as to nullify the existence of any 
other possible intent?" There is but one reasonable conclusion: 
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the answer must be "No." There is no implication of gift 
whatsoever. 
No dominant dispositive plan can be derived from the 
decedent's Will in this case, since there is no disposition of 
any assets to anyone. There is no gift by implication from the 
mere fact that the stepchildren are identified in the Will; the 
naming of the stepchildren seems to be an attempt to disinherit 
them from any attempt on their part to claim to be children of 
the decedent. There is certainly no dominant dispositive plan 
in the Will manifesting an intent to dispose of the estate to 
the stepchildren. This is fanciful conjecture on Hunt's part, 
but much more than mere conjecture is necessary: 
"To warrant the court in so declaring [a gift by 
implication] there must be something more than 
conjecture. The probability of an intention to make 
the gift implied must appear to be so strong that an 
intention contrary to that imputed to the testator 
cannot be supposed to have existed in his mind." This 
is a rule frequently since reiterated and applied. 
Estate of Ottoveggio, 145 P.2d 700, 702 (Cal. App. 
1944), quoting In Re Estate of Franckr 190 Cal. 28, 
31-32, 210 P. 417, 418. 
In his brief, Hunt cites two cases for the proposition that 
a gift by implication is appropriate. In one of these, Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank v. Tingley, 22 Wash.App. 258, 589 P.2d 811 
(1978), the court actually found no. gift by implication. Hunt 
quoted the court (Brief of Appellant, p. 8) as though the 
decision supported his position, but failed to include the 
following underlined language: 
Gifts by implication in wills generally are 
disfavored, They are not allowed on the basis of. 
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conjecture or mere silence in a will; the proponent 
must show that the testator had a manifest and plain 
intent to create the gift, but that he failed to 
express himself as distinctly as he should have. The 
showing of intent must be so strong that a contrary 
intent cannot be supposed to have existed in the 
testatorfs mind. Id. at 814. 
The court concluded that the record fell far short of showing 
the manifest and plain intention necessary for a gift by 
implication. 
The other case cited by Hunt is readily distinguishable. 
In In Re Will of McDowell, 81 N.M. 562, 469 P.2d 711 (1970), the 
joint and mutual Will had specific dispositive provisions. On 
the husband's death, the Will established a testamentary trust 
with a life estate for his wife and a remainder to nieces and 
nephews. On the wife's subsequent death, the Will provided for 
a life estate to her husband if he survived, and on his death 
for the funds to be distributed to the trust established by him; 
however, she survived her husband, and the Will contained no 
express provision for disposition of the estate if her husband 
failed to survive. Nevertheless, because of the clear 
dispositive plan contained in the testamentary trust for a 
remainder interest to vest in nieces and nephews, the court 
found that a gift to the nieces and nephews was intended. The 
court concluded that from the plan of the joint and mutual Will 
and the language of the Will itself, the "conclusion is 
inescapable" that both testators intended that the survivor 
should have a life estate in the property with the remainder to 
go to the nieces and nephews. Id. at 713. That is a very 
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different case from that which we are facing here, where the 
Will makes no disposition whatsoever. 
Here, only by guess, whim, or conjectures can a gift to the 
stepchildren be inferred. The probability that the decedent 
intended to make a gift to the stepchildren is not only not so 
strong that it cannot be supposed to have existed in his mind, 
it is nonexistent. 
III. THE ENTIRE ESTATE PASSES TO DECEDENT'S HEIRS BY 
INTESTATE SUCCESSION 
The entire estate in this case passes to the heirs at law 
because the law provides for such a disposition in the absence 
of a valid testamentary devise. The disinheritance clause in 
the Will cannot affect heirs at law. 
A. Assets Not Disposed of by a Will Pass Under the 
Laws of Intestate Succession 
The Will of Reed Dwane Hunt fails to dispose of any of 
his property. Utah Code Annotated § 75-2-101 mandates that "Any 
part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed of by 
his Will passes to his heirs." This is a long-standing rule of 
law and is universally accepted. 
One who leaves a portion of his estate undisposed of 
by his Will is presumed to know that the undistributed portion 
will pass under the statutory rules of succession. Estate of 
Dunn, 260 P.2d 964 (Cal. App. 1953). Further, the principles of 
intestate succession are so straightforward that courts have 
consistently ruled that assets not disposed of by a Will pass to 
the heirs at law. See -Re Estate of Emma Brown, 106 N.W.2d 535 
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(Mich. 1960). The doctrine of stare decisis is particularly 
applicable in the area of law pertaining to the descent of 
propertyf where stability of the law has peculiar value. In Re 
McKay Estate, 98 N.W.2d 604 (Mich. 1956). 
B . The Testator Is Presumed to Intend the Legal 
Effect of His Words 
The province of the court in construing a Will is 
subject to limitations, for valid policy reasons: 
There are well-defined limits, beyond which the courts 
have not gone and beyond which they could not go 
without subverting all rules and leaving the 
interpretation of every will to the mere caprice and 
whim of the chancellor. One of these rules, firmly 
established and never departed from or even 
criticized, is that the expressed intent will not be 
varied under the guise of correction, because the 
testator misapprehended its legal effect. The 
testator is presumed to know the law. If the legal 
effect of his expressed intent is intestacy, it will 
be presumed that he designed that intent. The inquiry 
will not go to the secret workings of the mind of the 
testator. It is not, what did he mean? but it is, 
what do his words mean? Estate of Mcllhattan, 224 N. 
W. 713 (Wis.)(emphasis added). 
"A court's inquiry in construing a will is limited to 
ascertaining what the testator meant by the language which was 
used. Tf he used language which results in intestacy, and there 
can be no doubt about the meaning of the language which was 
used/ the court must hold that the intestacy was intended. " 
Estate of Beldon, 11 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Cal.1938)(emphasis added). 
This is the clear rule governing cases of this type. "If the 
will clearly discloses that the testator did not dispose of all 
his property, particularly in the absence of a residuary clause, 
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then the omitted property must descend according to the laws of 
succession." Estate of Corwin, 383 P. 2d 393, 341 (Ida. 1963). 
C . A Disinheritance Clause Cannot Invalidate the 
Statutory Right of Heirs to Inherit Under 
Intestacy 
The provisions in paragraph Second of the Will 
granting $5.00 to any person establishing that he or she is 
decedent's child, and in paragraph Third of the Will giving 
$1.00 to any heir are disinheritance clauses, not bequests. See 
Estate of Kaseroff, 137 Cal. Rptr. 644, 562 P.2d 325, 327 (Cal. 
1977); Estate of Moore, 219 Cal. App. 2d 737, 741, 33 Cal. Rptr. 
427 (1963); Estate of Frinchaboy, 108 Cal. App. 2d 235, 238, 238 
P.2d 592 (1951) . 
A disinheritance clause has no effect whatsoever on assets 
passing by intestacy. When the testator attempts to exclude his 
heirs at law from inheriting his property, the exclusion goes 
only to such property as he has disposed of by his Will. Estate 
of Dunn, 260 P.2d 964, 965 (Cal.App. 1953); Estate of Lefranc, 
239 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952). In Estate of Barnes, 47 Cal. Rptr. 
430, 407 P.2d 656, 659 (Cal. 1965), the Supreme Court of 
California stated the rule governing intestate succession when 
the Will contains a disinheritance clause: 
It is settled that a disinheritance clause, no matter 
how broadly or strongly phrased, operates only to 
prevent a claimant from taking under the Will itself . 
. . . Such a clause does not and cannot operate to 
prevent the heirs at law from taking under the 
statutory rules of inheritance when the decedent has 
died intestate as to all or any of his property. 
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The statutory right of an heir to inherit assets is paramount to 
any direction from a testator, other than the valid disposition 
of the estate to another individual: 
The real question involved is whether when a testatrix 
expressly excludes known heirs from participation in 
her estate, she may thereby bar them from their 
statutory right to succeed to a portion of the estate 
undisposed of by the will. The answer is in the 
negative. If one leaves a part of his estate 
undisposed of by his will he will be presumed to have 
known that such portion will be distributed under the 
statutory rules of succession. Estate of Dunn, 260 
P.2d 964, 965 (Cal. App. 1953) 
An attempt to exclude legal heirs from participation 
in the estate of decedent is successful only as to 
such property as is disposed of by the will . . . . A 
testator must do more than merely evince an intention 
to disinherit before the heirs1 right of succession 
can be cut off. He must make a valid disposition of 
his property, [citations omitted] Estate of Munson, 
330 P. 2d 302, 304-305 (Cal. App. 1958) 
Other states also hold that disinheritance claims do 
not reach heirs-at-law. "The fact that a person is disinherited 
by the will does not prevent his sharing as an heir at law, in 
property the testamentary disposition of which has failed by 
lapse. . . . The testator cannot disinherit his heirs by words 
alone, but in order to do so the property must be given to 
somebody else." Estate of Stroble, 636 P. 2d 236, 242 (Kan. 
App. 1981) . 
As stated in Page on Wills, 
If testator does not dispose of the whole of his 
estate by his last will and testament, and such will 
contains negative words of exclusion [i.e., a 
disinheritance clause], the great majority of states 
hold that such negative words cannot prevent property 
from passing under the statutes of descent and 
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distribution. This question comes up, as a rule, when 
testator provides specifically in his will that 
certain heirs who are named or otherwise indicated 
shall not receive any part of his estate., If his will 
disposes of part of his property, but not all, such 
provision is without effect as to the property to 
which he makes no disposition by his will. . . . If 
testator has made a provision for an heir, which he 
apparently intends to be all the heir shall receive, 
such heir nevertheless takes his share of any 
intestate property. . . . Where testator shows by his 
whole will that his intention is to exclude certain 
near relatives in favor of more distant ones, any 
property undisposed of will, nevertheless, descend as 
intestate property to such near relatives to the 
exclusion of those more remote. 2 Page, A Treatise on 
the Law of Wills (Third [Lifetime] Edition) pp. 857, 
858, 859-60 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, the decedentfs property automatically vests 
in his heirs at law, as prescribed by Utah Code Annotated §75-3-
101, subject to probate administration: "Upon the death of a 
person, his real and personal property devolves to persons to 
whom it is devised by his last will . . . , or in the absence of 
testamentary disposition, to his heirs . . . ." The maker of a 
Will cannot limit the statute of descent and distribution as to 
property not disposed of by the Will: "A testator cannot limit 
or eliminate an heir from receiving that portion of an estate 
governed by the statute of descent and distribution except by 
disposing of the property by Will." Re Estate of Emma Brown, 
106 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Mich. 1960); see also Powers v. Powers, 67 
A.2d 837 (RI. 1949). Although a Will may clearly and 
unambiguously express an intent to disinherit an heir or next of 
kin, such heir or next of kin nevertheless shares in property 
which the testator failed to devise to another and as to which 
he consequently died intestate. Quattlebaum v. Simmons National 
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Bank, 184 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1954). Similarly, in Re Estate of 
Smith, 353 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. 1963), the court explained that no 
matter how strong the testator's intention to disinherit an heir 
may be expressed in a Will, that intention cannot be given any 
effect as to intestate property. The disinheritance clause is 
of no consequence because the property will be disposed of by 
intestate succession where no assets are disposed of by the 
Will. 
IV. DECEDENT'S HEIRS ARE HIS NEPHEW AND TWO NIECES 
A. Stepchildren Are Not Heirs 
The law is perfectly clear that stepchildren are not 
heirs at law. As defined in U.C.A. § 75-1-201(3) and (28), 
(3)"Child" includes any individual entitled to take as 
a child under this code by intestate succession from 
the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes 
any person who is only a stepchild, a foster child, a 
grandchild, or any more remote descendant, (emphasis 
added) 
(28)"Parent" includes any person entitled to take, or 
who would be entitled to take, if the child died 
without a will, as a parent under this code by 
intestate succession from the child whose relationship 
is in question and excludes any person who is only a 
stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent, (emphasis 
added) 
Therefore, under Utah law, stepchildren are not considered 
children for purposes of intestate succession. 
This is consistent with the law of other states. 
"Under the law of intestate succession, a stepson is not in any 
sense an heir of the decedent." Re McLauglin 's Estate, 523 P.2d 
437 (Wash.App. 1974). See also Re Estate of Smith, 299 P.2d 550 
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(Wash. 1956); Versland v. Carson Transport, 671 P.2d 583 (Mont. 
1983) . 
B . The Appellees (Nieces and Nephew) Are The Only 
Heirs 
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-103(17) defines "heirs" as 
those persons "who are entitled under the statutes of intestate 
succession to the property of the decedent.." Utah Code 
Annotated §75-2-103 (1)states: "the entire intestate estate if 
there is no surviving spouse, passes as follows: . . . .(c) if 
there is no surviving issue or parent, to the issue of the 
parents or either of them by representation" (emphasis added) . 
In turn, "issue" is defined as "lineal descendants of all 
generations, with the relationship of parent and child at each 
generation being determined by the definitions of child and 
parent contained in this code." U.C.A. § 75-2-103(21). It is 
undisputed that the only su^vi^ing issue of the decedent's 
parents are the three children of the decedent's only sibling. 
That nephew and two nieces (who are the Appellees) are the 
decedent's heirs at law. 
V . SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON HUNT FOR DELAY AND 
TAKING A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 33(a), R. Utah S. Ct., or Rule 33, Utah R. 
App. P., the Heirs request that they be awarded costs and 
attorney's fees in responding to this appeal. As has been shown 
above, Hunt lacks standing to appeal. Even if this Court had 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the District Court's Order 
must be affirmed because the grounds for appeal are meritless. 
No justification in law or fact exists for Hunt to have 
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subjected the Heirs to the unnecessary expense and delay of this 
appeal. 
At the time Hunt filed his Notice of Appeal, Rule 33 (a), R. 
Utah S. Ct. , and cases arising under it established the 
applicable law regarding sanctions for frivolous appeals. This 
Brief therefore discusses the law that arose under that Rule. 
We note, however, that Rule 33, Utah R. App. P., became 
effective April 1, 1990. We believe that the new rule merely 
codifies the existing law as it had developed, and that a 
discussion of the new rule for imposition of sanctions under it 
is therefore appropriate. 
A "frivolous appeal" has been defined as "one having no 
reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a) [R. 
Utah Ct. App.]" O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 
1987). Rule 40(a) required that the action "is well grounded 
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law." 
In Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987), the court 
awarded attorney's fees and costs to respondent because the 
appellant had misstated the facts and the law, and because the 
totality of appellant!s argument compelled the Court of Appeals 
to find that the appellant was attempting to take unconscionable 
advantage of the respondent. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 
309-310 (Utah App. 1987), then made it clear that a finding of 
bad faith was not necessary to a finding that an appeal is 
frivolous. 
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Sanctions have since been ordered in several cases, 
including for frivolous appeals filed for delay when the order 
appealed from was not a final appealable order (Kathy's Food 
Stores, Inc., v. Equitable Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 753 P.2d 
501 (Utah 1988); Backstrom Family Limited Partnership v. Hall, 
751 P. 2d 1157 (Utah App. 1988)) or where the appeal was not 
timely (Barber v. Emporium Partnership, 750 P.2d 202 (Utah App. 
1988) . Sanctions were also imposed where there was no 
reasonable basis for the appeal and the appellant's conduct was 
"conspicuously bad and offensive, i.e., egregious" in following 
a deliberate course of conduct designed to frustrate the 
purposes of the parties1 agreement. Brigham City v. Mantua 
Town, 754 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah App. 1988). 
Finding no legal or factual basis for an appeal that was a 
continuation of harassment, the Utah Court of Appeals cited some 
of the reasons justifying sanctions, when it stated that 
sanctions should be imposed when: 
"an appeal is obviously without any merit and has been 
taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and 
results in delayed implementation of the judgment of 
the lower court; increased costs of litigation; and 
dissipation of the time and resources of the Law 
Court." Porco v. Porcor 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 
1988), quoting Auburn Harpswell Ass'n v. Day, 438 A.2d 
234, 239 (Me. 1981). 
In Fife v. Fife, 111 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah App. 1989), the 
court awarded fees for a frivolous appeal because it was 
"obvious from the record that the trial court's findings were 
not clearly erroneous." The same is true in our case. 
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Finally, in Hunt v. Hurst, 125 Utah Adv.Rep. 23 (Utah 1990) 
this Court in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stewart 
addressed the issue of sanctions for a frivolous appeal. This 
Court quoted Black's Law Dictionary 601 (5th Ed. 1979) as 
defining a frivolous appeal as " [o]ne in which no justiciable 
question has been presented and appeal is readily recognizable 
as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect that it can 
ever succeed." 125 Utah Adv.Rep. at 25. The Court then quoted 
the new Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Practice. The Court 
noted that "a valid professional evaluation would reveal a 
complete lack of merit to the cause of action, " and emphasized 
that this is not an "arguable case." Id. The Court noted that 
pursuing frivolous claims against blameless defendants is not 
justified and that the litigation of new or uncertain issues 
will not be chilled by imposing sanctions on those who "pursue 
what in reality are nuisance claims." Id. 
The rationale of Hunt v. Hurst applies to the facts in our 
case. There is "no justiciable question" and the "appeal is 
readily recognizable as devoid of merit in that there is little 
prospect that it can ever succeed." This is a nuisance claim 
against blameless defendants, pursued in the hopes of 
negotiating some settlement. This is particularly true since a 
number of items of personal effects (including assets that had 
belonged to the Heirs' mother and which are not part of the 
estate) were removed from the decedent's residence during Hunt's 
tenure as personal representative, and have not yet been 
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returned to the estate. It has been reported that many of those 
assets have been distributed to the stepchildren. 
Rule 33(b), Utah R.App.P., defines a frivolous appeal as 
"one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing 
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law." This definition fits the facts in the 
case at bar. Here, there is no merit to the grounds asserted 
for appeal, and no reasonable likelihood of success for Hunt. 
Indeed, Hunt as the personal representative is not even a proper 
party to take this appeal. Even though he is no longer the 
personal representative, he has continued to prosecute the 
appeal. Hunt has never appealed in his individual capacity. 
Finally, at the trial court and on appeal, Hunt has failed to 
cite any credible authority or grounds for his position. 
Appellant's Brief is nothing more than the time-worn cry of 
every unsuccessful litigant: "I should have won." Hunt's 
position is not grounded in fact or warranted by existing law, 
and no argument has been made for the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law. 
Further, Hunt misstated, under oath, the identity of the 
decedent's heirs at law, in both his Application for Probate and 
his Petition for Interpretation of Last Will and Testament. He 
failed to comply with U.C.A. § 75-3-301 (2) (b) , which requires 
such identification. This was an apparent attempt to evade 
legal requirements of notice, preventing those most affected 
from receiving notice. This is particularly egregious since 
Hunt has been personally acquainted with all of the Heirs for 
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Hunt has been personally acquainted with all of the Heirs for 
many years, and knows their relationship to the decedent. The 
Petition for Interpretation Of Last Will And Testament appears 
to be a blatant attempt to obtain distribution of the estate for 
persons not entitled to the estate under the law, while 
intentionally failing to provide notice to the heirs. Hunt has 
consistently failed to act in good faith, attempting to gain an 
advantage without notifying those most affected. [See 
generally, verified petition in Record, pp. 32-33, 1 11, A-I] 
Hunt has failed to prepare or file an inventory, even when 
repeatedly requested by counsel and interested parties or 
ordered to do so by the court. To enable the Heirs and the 
successor personal representative to determine the assets of the 
estate, and to provide a listing of numerous assets taken into 
the personal possession of Hunt or others of the stepchildren, 
he was ordered by the District Court to file an Inventory and 
Appraisement and an accounting no later than December 8, 1989 
[Record, pp. 83, 86]. To date, Hunt has failed to file either 
the Inventory or the accounting. His actions serve no proper 
purpose and instead are interposed for delay. 
Based on the foregoing, it can only be concluded that the 
appeal is interposed for an improper purpose, "such as to harass 
or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation," Rule 40(a), R. Utah S. Ct., or "such as to harass, 
cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time 
that will benefit only the party filing the appeal." Rule 
33(b), Utah R.App.P. An appeal brought for delay is "one marked 
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which benefits only the appellant." O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 
306, 310 (Utah App. 1987). An award of fees and costs under 
Rule 33(a) is appropriate in this case. 
Hunt's prosecution of an unjusticiable appeal has forced 
the Heirs to incur substantial legal fees to protect their 
interests. The Heirs are entitled to recoup that unnecessary 
loss from Hunt because the appeal is frivolous and for delay. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's Order identifying the decedent's heirs 
affects only the rights of heirs and other potential claimants 
between themselves. Hunt as personal representative is not 
aggrieved by the Order, since the Order does not affect the 
estate or the personal representative in his official capacity. 
Hunt as the personal representative therefore lacks standing to 
appeal. Further, Hunt resigned as the personal representative 
on November 9, 1989; he cannot now prosecute the appeal in that 
capacity. No stepchild filed a notice of appeal individually, 
including Hunt. Summary affirmance of the Order is required in 
this situation. 
Based on settled law that has existed for centuries, it is 
clear that the intention of the testator must be deduced only 
from the words of the Will; that where the words of the Will 
make no disposition whatsoever of the assets, intestacy results; 
that the maxim of law favoring testacy is no greater than the 
presumption in favor of heirs, and the maxim gives way where 
there is no intention expressed in the Will to dispose of the 
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estate to anyone; that the courts will not engage in supposition 
or conjecture about a testator's intent where that intent is not 
expressed in the words actually used in the Will; and that a 
disinheritance clause does not invalidate the statutory right of 
heirs to inherit assets passing by intestacy. 
The Will in this case does not devise any of the estate; it 
contains no words of grant, no reference to any assets, and no 
designation that any person is to receive any assets. The 
testator expressed no intention regarding disposition of his 
estate; he is therefore presumed to have intended that no assets 
pass under the will, and that all assets pass by intestacy. 
Finally, there is no evidence in the Will of any dominant 
dispositive plan to benefit any stepchild; no gift by 
implication arises from the words used by the decedent in the 
Will. A reading of the Will compels but one reasonable 
conclusion: the entire estate must pass by intestacy to the 
Heirs, who are the Appellees. 
Therefore, the Heirs (Appellees) respectfully request that 
this Court (1) affirm the Order of the District Court, (2) 
require Hunt to pay the Heirs' costs and attorneys1 fees on 
appeal because Hunt has forced the Heirs to respond to an appeal 
that is frivolous and interposed for delay, and (3) remand to 
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the District Court for the determination of Appellees1 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
Dated: May 7, 1990 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE 
A Professional Corporation 
LYL& R. DRAKE 
Attorneys for Appellees: Dawna Bool, 
Jer^e>:son D. Goulette, and Charlene Brown 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of May, 1990, I 
served four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEES on 
each of the following by depositing the copies in the U.S. Mail, 
postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
Keith F. Oehler, Esq. 
P.O. Box 1234 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-1234 
Lyle R. Drake, 
Attorney for Appellees 
ADDENDUM 
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Lyle R. Drake - 3692 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE 
A Professional Corporation 
90 East 200 North 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, Utah 84771-0400 
801/628-1611 
File # 5772-01 ;LRD/CHW1 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) 
REED DWANE HUNT j 
Deceased. ; 
I ORDER CONSTRUING WILL 
I AND DETERMINING HEIRS 
i Probate No. 3202 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on July 11, 1989, Lyle R. Drake 
of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake appearing for Petitioners Dawna Bool, 
Jefferson D. Goulette, and Charlene Brown, and Keith Oehler appearing for the 
personal representative Richard L. Hunt and various stepchildren of the 
decedent. Both parties were heard, and requested an opportunity to file 
additional Memoranda Points and Authorities. Memoranda of Points and 
Authorities were filed by both parties and the matter was submitted to the Court 
for a ruling without oral argument, pursuant to Rule 04-501. The Court 
considered decedent's Will, the Memoranda of Points and Authorities, and all 
documents filed in this matter. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court makes the following findings of facts: 
A. The Will of the decedent dated December 2, 1988, fails to dispose 
of any assets. 
1 
nrnOG9 
••o 89 SEP 6 PFl 1 22 
I I I . ... im 
B. At the time of his death, the decedent had no living issue, spouse, 
parents, or siblings. 
C. Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette and Charlene Brown are the 
only children of decedent's only sibling, Jesse Hunt Goulette. 
D. Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette, and Charlene Brown, and their 
respective children, are the only living descendents of the decedent's parents. 
E. Richard L Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and 
Denice Marie Buckley are step-children of the decedent, and were never 
adopted by the decedent. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court makes the following conclusions of law: 
A. The assets of the decedent are not disposed of by his Will and 
therefore pass according to the laws of intestate succession, to the heirs of the 
decedent. 
B. The disinheritance clauses used in the Will do not prevent an heir 
from receiving a statutory intestate share of the estate. 
C. Stepchildren are not heirs of a decedent. 
D. Richard L Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and 
Denice Marie Buckley are not heirs of the decedent. 
E. Richard L. Hunt, Dennis Rae Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, and 
Denice Marie Buckley receive nothing under the Will of the decedent, either by 
its express terms or by implication. 
F. Pursuant to U.C.A. §75-2-103 (1), Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. 
Goulette, and Charlene Brown are the only heirs at law of the decedent. 
G. Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette, and Charlene Brown are the 
sole beneficiaries, in equal shares, of the entire estate of the decedent under 
his Will. 
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H. Notice has been given as required by law. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 
1. The heirs of the decedent are Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette, 
and Charlene Brown. 
2. The entire estate of the decedent vests in and shall be distributed 
to Dawna Bool, Jefferson D. Goulette and Charlene Brown in equal shares, 
subject to administration. 
DATED this s^ day of , 1989. 
PHILIP EVE 
istrict Court JiSdge 
J^«X-





I hereby certify that on the 6th day of September, 1989, I served a 
signed copy of the foregoing ORDER CONSTRUING WILL AND DETERMINING 
HEIRS on each of the following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-
paid, addressed to: 
Keith S. Oehler, Esq. 
P.O. Box 1234 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Secretary ^ 
4 
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'j i_; 
DEPUTY, 
-LUr v _ 
Keith F. Oehler f A2^49) 
Attorney for Personal ReDresentative 
216 South 200 West 
P.O. Box 1234 
Cedar Citv, Utah 84721-1234 
(801) 586-3711 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF : 
REED DWANE HUNT, : NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Deceased. : Probate No. 3202 
' £# 10%^ 
NOTICE is hereby given that Richard L. Hunt, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Reed Dwane Hunt, hereby appeals 
to the Utah Court of Appeals from the District Court's Order 
Construing Will and Determining Heirs entered in this action on 
September 5, 1939. 
DATED this 5th day o 
;y for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and complete C O D V 
of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to Lyle R. Drake, Esq., SNOW, 
nonmp. 
NUFFER, ENGSTROM & DRAKE, 90 East 200 North, P.O. Box 400, St. 
George, Utah 34771-0400, postage thereon fully prepaid, this 5th 
day of October, 1989. 
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III 
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Statutes and Rules Whose Interpretation Is Determinative 
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(3): 
(3) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take 
as a child under this code by intestate succession 
from the parent whose relationship is involved and 
excludes any person who is only a stepchild, a foster 
child, a grandchild, or any more remote descendant. 
(emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(17): 
(17) "Heirs" means those persons, including the 
surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes 
of intestate succession to the property of a decedent, 
(emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(21): 
(21) "Issue" of a person means all his lineal 
descendants of all generations, with the relationship 
of parent and child at each generation being 
determined by the definitions of child and parent 
contained in this code. 
Utah Code Annotated §75-1-201(28): 
(28) "Parent" includes any person entitled to take, or 
who would be entitled to take, if the child died 
without a will, as a parent under this code by 
intestate succession from the child whose relationship 
is in question and excludes any person who is only a 
stepparent, foster parent, or grandparent, (emphasis 
added) 
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-101: 
Any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively 
disposed of by his will passes to his heirs as 
prescribed in the following sections of this code. 
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-103(1) (c) : 
. the entire intestate estate if there is no 
surviving spouse, passes as follows: 
(c) If there is no surviving issue or parent, to the 
issue of the parents or either of them by 
representation" (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Annotated §75-2-603: 
The intention of a testator as expressed in his will 
controls the legal effect of his dispositions. The 
rules of construction expressed in the succeeding 
sections of this part apply unless a contrary 
intention is indicated by the will, (emphasis added) 
Utah Code Annotated §75-3-101: 
The power of a person to leave property by will and 
the rights of creditors, devisees, and heirs to his 
property are subject to the restrictions and 
limitations contained in this code to facilitate the 
prompt settlement of estates. Upon the death of a 
person his rs&I and personal property devolves La 
persons to whom it is devised by his last will or to 
those indicated as substitutes for them in cases 
involving lapse, renunciation, or other circumstances 
affecting the devolution of testate estate, or in the 
absence of testamentary disposition, to his heirs, or 
to those indicated as substitutes for them in cases 
involving renunciation or other circumstances 
affecting devolution of intestate estates, subject to 
homestead allowance, exempt property and family 
allowance, rights of creditors, elective share of the 
surviving spouse, and administration, (emphasis added) 
Rule 52 (a), U.R.C.P.: 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately 
its conditions of law thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 58A Findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and 
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses . . . . 
Rule 33(a), R. Utah S. Ct.: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If 
the court shall determine that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and single or 
double costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to 
the prevailing party. 
Rule 40(a), R. Utah S. Ct.: 
the signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the 
brief . . .; that to the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief, formed after reasonable 
inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted 
by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; 
and that it is not interposed for any improper 
purposes, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay 
or needless in the cost of litigation. . . . 
Rule 33, Utah R. App. P.: see following page 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the couit determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
<c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT k* ^" Igj 
' • • / j?eel.Dwajag.Jiuat — * resident 
1 8 ^ . . S o u t h ^ rUTAH 84737 yvj 
declare this to he my last Will and revoke all other Wills previously mads by me: 
FWHT: I Reed Dwane Hunt being of sound and disposing mind and memory, 
and not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence of any person 
whomsoever, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will 
and Testament, hereby revoking~any and all Wills, Codicils or Testamen-
tary dispositions by me at any time heretofore made. 
Second: I declare that I am a single man, and that I have four (4) step-
childern. Richard L Hunt, Delbert Douglas Hunt, Denice Marie Buckley, 
and Dennis Ray Hunt. If, at any time, any person shall be established 
by a Court of Law to be a child of mine, then I give and bequeath to 
each such person the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00) and no more. 
Third: I have intentionally and with full knowledge omitted to provide 
for any and all of my heirs and next of kin who are not specifically 
mentioned herein, and I hereby generally and specifically disinherit 
each, any and all persons whomsoever claiming to be or who may be 
lawfully determined to be my heirs at law, except as otherwise mentioned 
in this Will; and to any person or persons who shall sucessfully establish 
in a Court of competent jurisdiction, that he or she is entilted to any 
portion of my estate, other than as mentioned in this Will, I hereby 
give and bequeath to such person or persons the sum of ONE DOLLAR 
($1.00) and no more, in lieu of any other share or interest in my 
estate. 
: / appoint .Rijihaxd.J-^toitf;^ • 
Count* ..QJL..GUrk.».^S.U.t^^^Hg^ad#....mi.a 
es Execute...... of this Wt/L.JfaftJfoe^j^^^ 
jitlwutJiQXttl M ^ K f i t a u L J ^ ^ 
which I may own or be entitled to at his discretion. 
This Will was signed by me on the...JM Jay of StSSSSkSL , 19§L 
Tins FOURCOINC INSTRUMENT was, on the date thereof, signed hy the testa&QX*. .-..-• 
.....
 Re?.d. Pw.ane_Huiit , in our presence, we being present at the same 
time, and... he then declared to us that the said inttrument was h.is... last Witt; and we, at 
the request of said ^SS^JiSSSSJ^BS. ^ and in /L i* , presence, and tn 
the presence of each other, have signed the same as witnesses. Wc further declare that at the 
time of <J«ning thit will the j^..A?S4J2S™e . . .SH?i - appeared to he 
of sound and disusing mind end memory and not acting under dtirrss, menace, fraud or the 
unjbir ,!''*' ny~f nf ?ml pr^on nhomsornrr. 
^^CS/qlsJJUnJlJpt&v' residing at 
W / i . Z U E ^ L ^ residing at .JgJ& ^ 0 ^ ^ , ^ * • * 
residing at//£^J&4^^ 
******* •* W*n«» 
Si|p»t«r« of Wit 
p. tor 
